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THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION LEGISLATION:
A $10 BILLION BOONDOGGLE
INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) provisions of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984' replace the Domestic International Sales
Corporation (DISC) legislation 2 as the United States' primary tax
incentive for exporters.3 The change follows more than a decade of
controversy between the United States and its trading partners, who
argued that DISC constituted an export subsidy violating the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT).4 Although the
United States never conceded that DISC contravened GATT's un-
derlying policy, the Reagan Administration proposed the replace-
ment of DISC with FSC5 to soothe other GATT signatories, 6 most
notably the European Economic Community.
The FSC legislation has not satisfied the European Economic
Community. The European Economic Community contends that
the FSC legislation's outright forgiveness of approximately $10 bil-
lion in taxes deferred by United States exporters under DISC
amounts to an export subsidy violating GATT. 7
This Note explores the domestic and international implications
of the new FSC program. First, this Note examines the GATT
I Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Division A of the Act is the Tax Reform Act of 1984;
Division B is the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. Title VII of the Tax Reform Act of
1984 includes the FSC legislation. Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 801-805, 98 Stat. 985-1103
(1984) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (Supp. III 1985)). An FSC is a foreign corporation
formed by a United States exporter that remains subject to United States federal income
tax. For a discussion of the FSC mechanism, see infra notes 67-78 and accompanying
text.
2 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 53553 (1971) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). A DISC is a domestic "paper"
corporation through which its American exporting parent channels export income. For
a discussion of the DISC program, see infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
3 Congress has not repealed the DISC legislation. Small exporters may continue
to use DISC. However, amendments by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, § 802, 98 Stat. 997-99 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. § 995 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)),
require that small exporters pay interest on the taxes deferred.
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
5 This Note uses the acronyms "FSC" and "DISC" to refer both to the enabling
legislation and to the entities which exporters form.
6 New Reagan Proposal on Tax Aid for Exports, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1983, at D5, col.
1.
7 Europeans Announce Plans to Force GATT Review of DISC and FSC, 24 TAx NOTES 228
(1984).
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ground rules concerning export tax incentives and argues that
GATT unjustifiably discriminates against countries such as the
United States that use a direct, rather than indirect, tax system.8
Second, this Note discusses the DISC program (Congress's attempt
to counteract the GATT rules' discriminatory impact) and examines
other GAIT signatories' objections to the program.9 Third, it ana-
lyzes the FSC program, the congressional response to other trading
nations' condemnation of DISC as a GATT-illegal export subsidy.' 0
This Note argues that although the FSC mechanism complies with
the existing GAIT rules, Congress's forgiveness of approximately
$10 billion in taxes deferred under DISC constitutes an export sub-
sidy that violates GATT." Thus, Congress deprived the United
States Treasury of a source of substantial revenue without improv-
ing the United States' relations with its trading partners.' 2 This
Note argues that the United States should discard the discriminatory
GATT framework and reformulate the GAIT rules to more closely
reflect modem economic theory concerning indirect and direct
taxes.13
I
GATT's ARTIFICIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECT AND
INDIRECT TAXES
Article XVI:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
forbids a government's use of subsidies to bolster exports. 14
Although this provision appears to promote free international trade,
the rules promulgated to enforce it unjustifiably discriminate against
countries like the United States that rely on direct, rather than indi-
rect, taxation.' 5
Economists define direct taxes as those which a government im-
poses on a person or corporation.' 6 Income tax is a direct tax. Indi-
rect taxes, on the other hand, are imposed on things.' 7 The value-
8 See infra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 30-63 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 64-125 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 79-116 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 126-63 and accompanying text.
14 Article XVI:4 provides that contracting parties
shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the
export of any product ... [which] results in the sale of such product for
export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like
product to buyers in the domestic market.
3 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Doc-
UMENTS 31 (1958) (text of agreement in effect in 1958) [hereinafter cited as BISD].
15 See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., R. LIPSEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO PosrvE ECONOMICS 433 (5th ed. 1979).
17 See, e.g., id. at 433-34.
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added tax (VAT) is an indirect tax. Under a VAT system, govern-
ments impose a tax based upon the value added to a product at each
stage of production.18 The more value added by domestic produ-
cers, the greater the governments' total collection of tax.
The GATT rules do not prohibit a country from encouraging
exports by exempting exporters from indirect tax or by remitting
previously paid indirect tax. 19 For example, when a company ex-
ports a product subject to VAT the government may exempt the ex-
porting company from the tax on the value the ei porter added to
the product and may rebate the VAT that the exporter paid to its
supplier.20 The GATT theory assumes that an indirect tax has no
impact on export prices because exporters shift the tax benefit for-
ward to their foreign customers by reducing the export price.2 1 The
GATT rules, however, prohibit governments from exempting ex-
porters from direct tax or remitting to exporters previously paid di-
18 Smith, Value-Added Tax: The Case For, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 77, 78.
A simple example may help explain VAT. Suppose that Acme Resources Company sells
its product, widget material, to Beta Widget Manufacturing Company at a price of $2.
Beta manufactures and sells its product, widgets, to Delta Distribution Company for
$10. Delta packages and sells the finished product, widgets-in-a-can, to the ultimate
consumer for $20. The government would impose a VAT as follows:
Stage o Selling Cost of
Production Price Purchases Value Added
Acme Resources $ 2 $ 0 $ 2
Beta Manufacturing $10 $ 2 $ 8
Delta Distribution $20 $10 $10
Total Value Added
If the government imposes a VAT rate of 10%, Acme, Beta, and Delta will pay $0.20,
$0.80, and $1.00, respectively, as VAT. Acme will bill Beta $0.20 for the VAT, Beta will
bill Delta $1.00 ($0.80 for which Beta is liable plus $0.20 paid to Acme), and Delta will
bill the ultimate consumer $2.00 ($1.00 for which Delta is liable plus $1.00 paid to Beta).
Each seller expressly indicates the amount of VAT; the tax is not hidden in the product's
sales price. Surrey, Value-Added Tax: The Case Against, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1970,
at 86, 87.
For a detailed discussion of other types of value-added tax, see R. LINDHOLM, THE
ECONOMICS OF VAT (1980).
19 An interpretative note to article XVI provides:
The exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the
product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such
duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued,
shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.
3 BISD, supra note 14, at 71 (emphasis added). Thus, article XVI:4 permits only the
remission or exemption of indirect tax. See K. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 139 (1970).
20 Surrey, supra note 18, at 91. The VAT rebate's effect may be illustrated by recon-
sidering the example presented supra in note 18. If Delta Distribution Company sells
widgets to a foreign consumer, the government will exempt Delta from the VAT of$ 1.00
for which Delta is liable and will also rebate $1.00 (representing the amount of VAT
Delta previously paid its suppliers).
21 Surrey, supra note 18, at 92. Similarly, the government may impose a border tax
equal to the VAT on imports, thereby subjecting imports to the same level of tax as
domestically produced goods. Id.
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rect tax. 22 Thus, a country using income tax may not use remissions
or exemptions to provide an incentive to exporters.
The economic justification behind the distinction between di-
rect and indirect taxes rests upon the assumption that producers
shift indirect taxes, but not direct taxes, forward as a component of
price. 23 The GATT theory characterizes price reductions due to tax
benefits in direct tax jurisdictions as subsidies designed to compen-
sate exporters for the differential in price between the domestic and
foreign markets. Tax benefits in indirect tax jurisdictions, however,
are deemed legitimate price components. 24
Modem economic theory establishes that the GATT distinction
between direct and indirect taxes is artificial. Economists generally
agree that exporters in indirect tax jurisdictions 25 do not fully shift
tax savings forward to consumers. 26 Similarly, economists contend
that exporters shift some direct tax benefits forward. 27
22 In 1970, a GATT working party examined article XVI:4 and issued an interpre-
tive report which includes a list of practices the working party considered subsidies.
Two of the condemned practices are remitting direct tax to exporters and exempting
exporters from direct tax. Subsidies: Report Adopted 19 November 1960, GATT Doc.
L/1381, reprinted in BISD, supra note 14, at 185-86 (9th Supp. 1961).
23 K. DAM, supra note 19, at 214.
24 To illustrate, if the United States exempts from the income tax all income Ameri-
can shoe manufacturers derive from selling shoes abroad, the price of American shoes in
foreign markets will decrease and the volume of sales will increase. Why will the price
decrease? The GATT theory presumes that the price drop derives from a subsidy: by
eliminating the income tax, the United States in effect compensates American manufac-
turers for selling their products abroad at a lower price. The GATT theory rejects the
proposition that prices decrease because American manufacturers pass their tax savings
on to consumers.
According to Professor Kenneth Dam, GATT assumes that exporters shift indirect
taxes (but not direct taxes) forward as a component of price. K. DAM, supra note 19, at
214. This Note's analysis of the policy behind the assumption that direct tax refunds
represent subsidies for the price differential in domestic and foreign markets stems from
Dam's explanation of the GATT theory on the forward shifting of direct and indirect
taxes.
25 This Note divides the world into indirect and direct tax jurisdictions for illustra-
tive purposes. Most countries use both forms of tax to varying degrees. See K. DAM,
supra note 19, at 219 n.19.
26 Id. at 214-15. An exporter receiving an indirect tax refund reduces export price
in part because the government compensates the exporter for the price differential be-
tween domestic and foreign markets. "[R]ecent, more sophisticated economic analysis
.... indicates that the shifting of tax burden does not depend so much on the type of tax
as upon competitive market conditions." 3 Export Policy, 1978: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1978) (prepared statement of Richard Hammer, Partner, Price
Waterhouse & Co.) [hereinafter cited as Export Policy Hearing]; see also K. DAM, supra note
19, at 215 ("[F]ull refund of an indirect tax constitutes in fact a subsidy to exports and
therefore has the same distorting effect on international trade that any other export
subsidy would have.").
27 Most economists agree that exporters shift direct tax savings forward. They disa-
gree, however, as to the extent of such shifting. See, e.g., K. DAM, supra note 19, at 214-
15.
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Despite economists' suggestion that exporters behave similarly
in both direct and indirect tax systems, GATT treats direct and indi-
rect export tax incentive schemes in diametrically opposed ways. 28
Although some economists disagree as to the extent of the forward
shifting that occurs under direct and indirect tax regimes, few sup-
port GATT's rigid distinction. 29
II
CRITICISM OF THE DISC PROGRAM UNDER GATT
The United States Congress enacted the Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation legislation in 1971 to offset the discrimina-
tory impact of GATT's distinction between direct and indirect
taxes. 30 Congress accepted the modern view that no appreciable
difference exists between the impact of direct and indirect taxes on
prices.3 ' Congress designed the DISC legislation's benefits to
equalize American exporters with foreign counterparts exporting
from countries providing indirect tax refunds and exemptions.3 2
A. How DISC Works
The DISC legislation permits an exporter to defer the payment
of tax on income derived from exporting by establishing and chan-
nelling export income through a DISC.3 3 A DISC need not perform
28 The GAIT distinction between indirect and direct taxes may be traced to 1957,
when article XVI of the GAIT was amended to exempt remissions of indirect taxes from
the restrictions placed on other forms of subsidies. See Export Policy Hearing, supra note
26, at 230-32. The GATT drafters reasoned that GATT should not condemn refunds of
indirect taxes because products should not be subject to both an exporting country's
indirect taxes and an importing country's excise taxes. This argument presumes, how-
ever, that exporters shift indirect taxes forward to consumers. Id. at 229.
29 See K. DAM, supra note 19, at 216 ("[lt is hard to find authors who support with-
out qualification the assumption behind the GAIT rules.").
30 See S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1971) (purpose of DISC is to
"remov[e] discrimination against those who export through U.S. corporations").
31 "[U]Itimately there is no difference [between direct and indirect taxation in
terms of their effect on prices]. Ultimately, any company, however they are taxed, has to
pass on ... [t]hat tax as a cost of the item manufactured to the consumer." 1 Foreign
Trade, 1971: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Sen. Comm. on Finance,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1971) (statement of John Connally, Secretary of Treasury)
[hereinafter cited as Foreign Trade Hearings].
32 European nations began to harmonize their value-added tax systems in 1967.
Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GATT 72 AM. J. INT'L L.
747, 750-51 (1978).
33 A corporation must meet four requirements to qualify as a DISC: (1) an exporter
must incorporate its DISC in any state, I.R.C. § 992(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); (2)
the DISC must derive at least 95% of its gross receipts from the sale or lease of goods
outside the United States, id. §§ 992(a)(1)(A), 993 (f) (1982); (3) the DISC must invest at
least 95% of the adjusted bases of its gross assets in exporter-related assets, id.
§ 992(a)(1)(B); and (4) the DISC's capital must equal or exceed $2,500 and consist of
only one class of common stock, id. § 992(a)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1985).
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any functions apart from its parent, nor must it maintain office
space, employees, or equipment.3 4 The legislation exempts the
DISC from federal taxation, but requires the parent to report and
pay tax on a portion of the DISC's income by deeming that the
DISC distributed that portion of its income to the parent.3 5 Con-
gress deferred taxation of the portion of DISC income not deemed
distributed until the DISC actually distributes such income, or the
DISC loses DISC status. 36
Because DISCs generally acquire inventory from a parent cor-
poration, section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code attributes only a
portion of the total income from an exporting transaction to a
DISC.3 7 Section 482 also requires that related taxpayers observe
arm's length pricing principles in intercompany transactions.38 In
order to provide tax benefits to exporters, the DISC legislation al-
lows a DISC to use liberal intercompany pricing rules to defer more
income than section 482 normally allows.3 9
Passage of the Foreign Sales Corporation legislation did not
make DISC obsolete. DISC remains in effect to benefit small United
States exporters which do not meet the foreign presence require-
ments of the FSC legislation.40 The FSC legislation4 l amends the
34 See Bretz, Current Developments on Domestic International Sales Corporations, 9 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 385, 387 (1984). The Treasury Regulations also require that a
DISC have its own bank account, Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1(a)(6) (1982), and maintain its
own set of books, Treas. Reg. § 1.992-1(a)(7) (1982).
35 The DISC legislation deems that a DISC distributes 57.5% of its income to its
parent. I.R.C. § 291(a)(4) (Supp. III 1985).
36 Id. § 995 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
37 Id. § 482 (1982).
38 I.R.C. § 482 provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (.
whether or not organized in the United States ... ) owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute,
apportion or allocate gross income, deductions, credits or allowances be-
tween or among such organizations, trades or businesses if he determines
that distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades or businesses.
Id. The regulations provide:
The purpose of Section 482 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax
parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the
standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the
property and business of a controlled taxpayer .... The standard to be
applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's
length with another uncontrolled taxpayer.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (1982).
39 The legislation allows a DISC to derive income from either the § 482 arm's
length price or the greater of (1) four percent of qualified export receipts plus 10% of
export promotion expenses, or (2) 50%o of the combined taxable income of the DISC
and its related supplier plus 10% of export promotion expenses. I.R.C. § 994(a) (1982).
40 See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
41 Deficit Reduction Act § 802 (codified at I.R.C. § 995 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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DISC provisions of the Internal Revenue Code by providing that
DISC shareholders must pay interest on deferred DISC tax,42 and
that any DISC taxable income in excess of $10 million is deemed
distributed to shareholders.43
B. International Criticism of DISC
Canada and the European Economic Community (EEC) chal-
lenged DISC shortly after its 1971 enactment. 44 Within two years
the EEC filed a formal complaint 45 alleging that DISC violated
GATT article XVI:4. 46 The complainants argued that DISC consti-
tuted an illegal export subsidy because its tax deferral was
equivalent to an "exemption" of direct tax.47
The United States countered with formal complaints against
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, contending that DISC
merely copied the hidden subsidy effects produced by European tax
laws. 48 Belgium, France, and the Netherlands avoid the impact of
international double taxation by using variations of the territorial
method under which a nation exempts its residents' foreign source
income from its own tax base.49 The United States claimed that Bel-
gian, French, and Dutch tax laws exempt substantial export income
from domestic taxation, resulting in a "far greater subsidy" 50 than
42 I.R.C. § 995(f)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
43 I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(E) (Supp. III 1985).
44 Jackson, supra note 32, at 760-61 & n.31 ("Canada and the European Economic
Community expressed the opinion that DISC would amount to direct subsidization of
exports inconsistent with GATT principles."). Other authors have reviewed the interna-
tional dispute more extensively. See, e.g., Bretz, supra note 34, at 387-89; Note, The GATT
Qualifier: Its Validity as a Tax Standard and Its Effect on DISC and DISC Alternatives, 16 COR-
NELL INT'L LJ. 469 (1983).
45 The EEC utilized the dispute settlement procedures of GATT art. XXIII to initi-
ate its complaint. Article XXIII can be summarized as follows:
If any contracting party believes a benefit it should get under GATT has
been "nullified or impaired" as a result of another contracting party's
breach or other measure, then it may seek consultation [with the alleged
offender] and if that fails, the complainant may ask the plenary GATT
body to authorize (by majority vote) suspension of GAIT obligations (a
sort of "retaliation") as a response.
Jackson, supra note 32, at 754 (emphasis in original).
46 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
47 Export Policy Hearing, supra note 26, at 214-15 (prepared statement of Richard
Hammer).
48 Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Toklyo Round: An Un5finished Business, 13
CORNELL INr'L LJ. 145, 164 (1980).
49) Analysis of Proposals Relating to Comprehensive Tax Reform, 25 TAx NOTES 161 (1984).
The United States and most other major trading nations use the foreign tax credit
method to avoid international double taxation. A country using this method includes its
residents' worldwide income in the tax base and permits a credit for foreign taxes paid.
Id.
50 Export Policy Hearing, supra note 26, at 215 (prepared statement of Richard
Hammer).
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the tax benefits provided to United States exporters under DISC.51
The United States further argued that DISC, unlike the foreign tax
laws, merely provided for deferral of direct tax.52
Four panels established by the GATT Council to review each of
the complaints issued their reports in 1976. 53 The panels con-
cluded that DISC and the Belgian, French, and Dutch tax laws all
constituted violations of GATT article XVI:4. 54 The GATT Council
adopted the panel reports in 1981,55 but qualified them56 to provide
that: (1) a country is not required to tax economic processes located
51 The United States filed its admittedly "unrealistic legal claim" in order to "dram-
atize its contention that the complaint by the EEC ... was equally improper." Hudec,
supra note 48, at 164.
52 See Note, supra note 44, at 479 (outlining Deputy United States Trade Represen-
tative David Macdonald's argument that "the effect of DISC is the deferral of tax on ap-
proximately 17% of the combined income attributable to DISC sales, and that this
deferral percentage is lower than the percentage of income upon which exemption may be
allowed under a territorial system." (emphasis added, footnotes omitted)).
53 See Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), BISD, supra note 14, at
98 (23d Supp. 1978); Report of the Panel, Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, BISD,
supra note 14, at 114 (23d Supp. 1978); Report of the Panel, Income Tax Practices Maintained
by Belgium, BISD, supra note 14, at 127 (23d Supp. 1978); Report of the Panel, Income Tax
Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, BISD, supra note 14, at 137 (23d Supp. 1978).
54 Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), BISD, supra note 14, at 113
(23d Supp. 1978); Report of the Panel, Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, BISD, supra
note 14, at 126 (23d Supp. 1978); Report of the Panel, Income Tax Practices Maintained by
Belgium, BISD, supra note 14, at 136 (23d Supp. 1978); Report of the Panel, Income Tax
Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, BISD, supra note 14, at 146 (23d Supp. 1978). The
Panel considering United States tax legislation's conclusion that DISC was illegal under
GATT art. XVI:4, rested on its finding that (1) DISC was an export subsidy, and (2)
DISC created an export price lower than the price of like goods in the domestic market.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text. The Panel concluded that DISC constituted a
prima facie subsidy because it viewed the absence of an interest charge on the deferred
tax as an "exemption" from direct tax. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation
(DISC), BISD, supra note 14, at 113 (23d Supp. 1978). The Panel utilized a presumption
to find that DISC caused "bi-level pricing." Id. The Panels apparently agreed with the
United States' contention that the European tax laws subsidized exports. Hudec, supra
note 48, at 165 n.61 ("GATT obligations are contractual, and the words of a contractual
obligation should never be read to arrive at results so clearly at odds with the parties'
intentions.").
55 Reports Adopted: Tax Legislation, BISD, supra note 14, at 114 (28th Supp. 1982).
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1979 partly caused the five-year
delay between the issuance of the Panel reports and adoption by the GATT Council.
The Tokyo Round produced a "Subsidies Code," Agreement on Intepretation and Applica-
tion of Articles 17, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Subsidies Code),
GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W236, reprinted in BISD, supra note 14, at 56 (26th Supp. 1980),
containing an illustrative list of export subsidies, including "(e) the full or partial ex-
emption, remission or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes ... paid or
payable by industrial or commercial enterprises." Id. at 81 (emphasis added). Although
the inclusion of the word "deferral" clearly broadened the official definition of "export
subsidy," see supra note 22 and accompanying text, and seemed to condemn DISC, a
footnote to the illustrative list explained that the GAIT Council did not intend the ref-
erence to deferral to prejudge the DISC case. The footnote also indicated that a defer-
ral of direct tax may not constitute an export subsidy if the government collects an
interest charge on the deferred tax. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of ,.rticles VI,
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outside its territory;57 (2) a country must apply arm's length pricing
principles between exporting companies and foreign buyers; and (3)
a country may utilize measures to avoid double taxation of foreign
source income. Arguing that because DISC provided a smaller tax
benefit and thereby promoted exports to a lesser extent than the
Belgian, French, and Dutch systems, the United States recom-
mended that the GATT Council approve DISC under the
qualifier. 58
The EEC became impatient with the slow resolution process
and requested in 1982 that the United States pay the EEC over $2
billion in compensatory damages arising from the subsidizing effects
of DISC.59 Although the GATT Council did not act on this request,
the United States recognized that relations with its trading partners
were deteriorating.60
In 1983, the Reagan Administration proposed what Congress
later enacted as the FSC legislation. 61 The Administration believed
that the FSC program would circumvent the EEC's retaliatory
threats, eliminate the demand for compensatory damages,62 and
bolster the United States' reputation in the international
community. 63
XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra, reprinted in BISD, supra
note 14, at 82 n.2.
56 Reports Adopted: Tax Legislation, BISD, supra note 14, at 114 (28th Supp. 1982); see
GATT Acts on Export Tax Aid Panel Reports, 13 TAx NOTES 1485 (1981).
57 The first prong of the qualifier implicitly requires a country to tax economic
processes located inside its territory. Note, supra note 44, at 475 n.24.
58 For an analysis of the United States' position, see Note, supra note 44.
59 DISCs: GATT Postpones Action on EC Request for DISC Damages, (July-Aug.] DAILY
TAx REP. (BNA) No. 141, at LL-1 (July 22, 1982). The EEC relied on the Treasury
Department's 1979 estimate that exports of $10 billion were attributable to DISC in its
computation. Id. at LL-2.
60 Bretz, supra note 34, at 390 ("[T]he United States found itself increasingly iso-
lated in the sixty-four member GATT body." (footnote omitted)).
61 See New Reagan Proposal on Tax Aid for Exports, supra note 6.
62 "The Administration believes that enactment of... [FSC] is essential if we are to
avert a real threat of retaliation, and if we are ever to make progress toward resolving
one of our longest, outstanding trade disputes [sic]." Foreign Sales Coyporation Act: Hear-
ings on S. 1804 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1984) (pre-
pared statement of Robert E. Lightizer) [hereinafter cited as Lightizer's Statement].
63 Maintenance of the DISC already has seriously impaired our effectiveness
in challenging subsidies and other unfair trade practices of other nations
that are damaging to our exports. Other governments are hesitant to
enter agreements with us to discipline their subsidies because they be-
lieve we are maintaining an illegal subsidy under DISC. Likewise, our
efforts to use and improve the dispute settlement procedure under
GATT are undermined by the impression held by many nations that we
are unwilling to abide by the GATT decision on DISC.
1986] 1189
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III
FSC AS A DISC REPLACEMENT
Congress enacted FSC not only to eliminate the controversy
over DISC, but also to provide an export tax incentive comparable
to DISC in terms of benefit to exporters and cost to the Treasury.64
Congress perceived that foreign tax laws disadvantage American ex-
porters in the world marketplace. 65 Just as in its enactment of DISC
in 1971, Congress designed the FSC legislation to shield American
exporters from these disadvantages. 66
A. How FSC Works
The FSC legislation67 permits an American company to gain tax
benefits by forming a foreign corporation to engage in exporting.
The foreign corporation remains subject to United States taxation;
the FSC legislation, however, exempts a portion of the foreign cor-
poration's income from federal tax. 68 The remaining portion re-
mains taxable to the FSC.69
To qualify for FSC status, an American exporter must meet two
requirements. First, the exporter must incorporate its FSC in a for-
eign country with which the United States has entered into an ex-
change of information agreement, or in a United States possession
other than Puerto Rico. 70 Second, the FSC must establish a "for-
eign presence" by maintaining an office outside the United States. 71
The legislation allows an FSC to claim benefits on that portion of its
income derived from the sale or lease of goods outside the United
States72 only if the FSC meets additional "foreign management"
64 Id. at 62 (DISC replacement "must (1) be GAIT consistent; (2) be revenue neu-
tral; (3) maintain the same level of benefit for U.S. exporters as existed under the
DISC").
65 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
66 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON DEFICIT
REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 634-35 (Comm. Print 1984).
67 For a detailed discussion of the FSC mechanism, see Granwell & Rosensweig, An
Analysis of the Foreign Sales Corporation Provision and Rules, 28 TAX NOTES 1265 (1985).
68 If an FSC uses the § 482 rules to determine transfer price in a particular transac-
tion, the legislation exempts 32% of the income attributable to such transaction from
federal tax. I.R.C. § 923(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985). If an FSC uses the administrative pric-
ing rules, 16/23 of the income attributable to the transaction is exempt. Id. § 923(a)(3).
69 United States corporate shareholders of an FSC obtain a 100% dividends re-
ceived deduction on dividends attributable to the exempt portion of an FSC's income.
Id. § 245(c)(1)(2).
70 Id. § 922(a)(1)(A). An FSC may not have more than 25 shareholders. An FSC
may have more than one class of common stock, but it may not issue preferred stock. Id.
§ 922(a)(I)(C).
71 Id. § 922(a)(1)(D). The FSC must maintain a permanent set of records at the
foreign office and certain other records at a United States location. Id. At least one
director must not be a United States resident. Id. § 922(a)(1)(E).
72 Id. § 924(a). Specifically, an FSC computes the exempt portion of its income
1190 [Vol. 71:1181
19861 REFORMULATING GATT RULES 1191
and "foreign economic process" tests. 73
FSCs, like DISCs, generally acquire goods for sale or lease from
related suppliers. Thus an FSC must fix the transfer price to deter-
mine its tax benefits. The legislation provides that an FSC may use
either the arm's length provisions of section 48274 or the adminis-
trative pricing rules to determine income. 75 If it uses the adminis-
trative pricing rules, the FSC must comply with standards of foreign
contact more stringent than those under the foreign economic pro-
cess test.
7 6
Finally, a crucial provision of the FSC legislation forgives taxes
previously deferred under the DISC program.77 The effect has been
to forgive approximately $10 billion in potential tax revenue. 78
from "foreign trading gross receipts" (FTGR). FTGR are receipts from the sale or lease
of products manufactured in the United States and sold abroad. Id.
73 I.R.C. § 924(b)-(d) (Supp. III 1985). The most significant requirement of the
foreign management test mandates that an FSC must hold its shareholder and board
meetings outside the United States. Id. § 924(c)(1). The FSC legislation also requires an
FSC to maintain its principal bank account outside the United States and to disburse
funds for dividends, fees, and salaries from foreign bank accounts. Id. § 924(c)(2)-(3).
The FSG legislation imposes the foreign economic process test on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. A transaction will meet the foreign economic process test if (1) the
FSG solicits, negotiates or makes the particular contract outside the United States, and
(2) foreign direct costs incurred by the FSC equal or exceed 507% of the total direct costs
attributable to the transaction. Id. § 924(d)(1). Foreign direct costs are expenses in-
curred by the FSC outside the United States which are attributable to (1) advertising, (2)
order processing and arranging for delivery, (3) transportation, (4) "determination and
transmittal of a final invoice or statement of account and the receipt of payment," and
(5) the assumption of credit risk. Id. § 924(d)(3). An FSC meets the foreign economic
process test's second prong if the foreign direct costs attributable to any two of the five
activities listed above equal or exceed 85% of the total direct costs attributable to the
transaction. Id. § 924(d)(2).
74 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
75 I.R.G. § 925(a)(l)-(3) (Supp. III 1985). The FSC administrative pricing rules
permit an FSC to choose the greater of (1) 1.83% of foreign trading gross receipts, or
(2) 23% of the combined taxable income of the FSC and its related supplier. Id.
§ 925(a)(l)-(2). If the FSC uses the second rule, only 46% of the combined taxable
income of the FSC and its related supplier is available for tax benefits. Id. § 925(d).
76 Id. § 925(c).
77 Deficit Reduction Act § 805(b)(2)(A). Specifically, the legislation provides that a
DISC which existed as of December 31, 1984, can distribute its accumulated income to
shareholders tax-free. Id.
78 Estimates of the tax forgiven under the FSC legislation range from $9 billion to
$13.6 billion. See, e.g., Bernick, Administration Seeks Assurances fiom Europe on DISC Replace-
ment Proposal, 22 TAX NOTES 270, 271 (1984) ($9-$ I0 billion); Kotran, Of DISCs and FSCs,
24 TAX NOTES 8 (1984) ($I0$13 billion); A Tax Break for Exports that Hurts "The Small Guy
in Kansas, "Bus. Wx., Jan. 16, 1984, at 86 ($10 billion); What the Deficit Reducing Bill Would
Do, Wash. Post, June 29, 1984, at A17, col. 3 ($11 billion); Metzenbaum, "The Great Tax
Grab," Wash. Post, July 19, 1984, at A20, col. 4 ($13.6 billion); Fact Sheet No. 98-34,
Democratic Study Group, at 14 (June 25, 1984) (on file at Cornell Law Review) ($10-$12
billion).
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B. The Validity of FSC Under the GATT Qualifier
Apart from the forgiveness provision, the FSC mechanism com-
plies with the GATT qualifier. 79 The FSC's foreign presence, man-
agement, and economic process requirements mandate enough
foreign activity to qualify a particular transaction as a legitimate for-
eign process under the GATT qualifier's first prong.80
The FSC mechanism also complies with the GATT qualifier's
second prong, requiring arm's length pricing between related par-
ties. 81 Congress structured the FSC mechanism to avoid problems
such as those DISC encountered. Under DISC, Congress adopted
administrative pricing rules to ensure that substantial tax benefits
would accrue to United States exporters that established DISCs.8 2
The EEC objected to the DISC administrative pricing rules on the
grounds that those rules did not adequately reflect arm's length
pricing.8 3 Although FSC also provides administrative pricing
rules,8 4 the FSC rules allocate to an FSC only forty-seven percent of
the amount that the old rules allocated to a DISC.8 5 This reduction
indicates Congress's intent to more accurately estimate arm's length
pricing under FSC. 86 Moreover, when an FSC uses the administra-
tive pricing rules, the FSC must perform substantially more activi-
ties abroad than if the FSC determined the transfer price under
section 482.87 The use of administrative pricing rules based on rec-
ognized arm's length principles and the imposition of additional
79 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
80 Accord Lightizer's Statement, supra note 62, at 62-63. One commentator argues
that foreign incorporation alone satisfies the first prong of the GATT qualifier and
therefore the "substantial foreign presence requirements are unnecessary to ensure that
[FSC] ... will not violate GATT." Note, supra note 44, at 499.
81 See supra text following note 57.
82 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
83 The EEC argued that "the 4 per cent and 50 per cent rules of thumb were incon-
sistent with the arm's-length principle under which profits were allocated to different,
even if closely related, entities by reference to conditions of fully effective competition."
Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), BISD, supra note 14, at 105 (23d
Supp. 1978).
84 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
85 The 47% figure is derived by comparing the administrative pricing rules under
DISC and FSC. The 1.83% of foreign trading gross receipts option under FSC, see supra
note 75, allocates approximately 47% of the income that the 4% of qualified export
receipts option allocated under DISC. The 23% of combined taxable income option
under FSC, see id., also allocates approximately 47% of the income that the 50% of
combined taxable income option allocated under DISC.
86 See Goldberg, GATT and Export Tax Incentives: The Proposed Foreign Sales Corporation,
42 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx. 32-1, 32-27 n.82 (1984) ("It has been reported that the reduc-
tion to 46 percent of the current DISC allocation formulas was based upon an economic
analysis of the relationship between the DISC allocation formulas and actual arm's-
length pricing, with a view to achieving a transfer price mechanism for the FSC which
would be acceptable under GATT.").
87 See supra text accompanying note 76.
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foreign presence requirements on FSCs using the administrative
pricing rules satisfy the qualifier's second prong88 and should quell
EEC objections.8 9
The third prong of the qualifier, which permits a nation to
adopt measures to avoid international double taxation, allows the
exclusion of a portion of an FSC's income from federal taxation.90
FSC exempts some foreign trade income from federal tax, but such
income remains taxable in the host country.9'
C. Forgiving the DISC-Deferred Tax
The most troubling provision of the FSC legislation does not
concern the FSC mechanism; rather, it involves the forgiveness of
taxes deferred under the DISC program.9 2 Because it applies to ap-
proximately $10 billion in taxes deferred under DISC,93 FSC's for-
giveness provision was the crucial issue during the congressional
debates .94
Congress's enactment of the forgiveness provision followed an
intensive lobbying effort by American exporters.9 5 The exporters
argued that collection of the DISC-deferred tax would overburden
industry and result in fewer American exports. For example, a
group of trade associations urged Chairman Rostenkowski of the
House Ways and Means Committee to support the forgiveness pro-
vision because the DISC-deferred tax had already been invested in
capital assets:
[T]he deferred taxes do not exist in separate bank accounts but in
many instances in the form of bricks and mortar and other illiquid
assets. Therefore; a tax on DISC-deferred income would be noth-
ing more than a tax on current U.S. production and employment
in the United States and should be recognized as such. DISC-gen-
erated investments were made on the basis of assurances by suc-
cessive Administrations that the DISC deferrals were intended to
continue so long as invested in export assets .... To tax these
deferrals retroactively would unjustifiably penalize U.S. exporters
who in good faith have followed the requirements of the DISC
88 Accord Lightizer's Statement, supra note 62, at 63.
89 But see Goldberg, supra note 86, at 32-35 ("the allocation still may be subject to
challenge").
90 See supra text accompanying note 57.
91 I.R.C. § 921 (Supp. III 1985). Because an FSC may still perform some of its
activities within the United States, some of its income may remain subject to United
States tax. See id. § 924(d).
92 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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statute over the years. 96
Some proponents of the forgiveness provision argued also that
the additional costs associated with the FSC foreign presence, man-
agement, and economic process requirements 97 offset any benefit
resulting from the forgiveness. 98 Others argued that collecting a tax
on deferred DISC income would have a devastating effect on ex-
porters' balance sheets. 9 9 Many exporters did not carry the DISC-
deferred tax on their financial statements as a deferred liability.
Lobbyists argued that adjusting their balance sheets to reflect the
deferred DISC tax liability would render exporters less competitive
in the debt and equity markets. 0 0
1. The Forgiveness Provision as an Export Subsidy
Prohibited by GATT
Before Congress enacted the FSC legislation, the Reagan Ad-
ministration sought "some sort of private assurance . . . that the
[EEC] will look favorably on the legislation."10' The EEC refused
and later indicated that it would officially challenge the FSC legisla-
tion after President Reagan signed the bill into law.' 0 2 The EEC
maintains that where DISC only permitted tax deferral, the FSC for-
giveness provision, which provides "what a European ambassador
described as 'a free gift to companies that benefitted from
DISC,' "103 is a GATT-prohibited direct subsidy. 10 4
96 Letter of 18 Trade Associations to the Honorable Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman,
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (May 8, 1984), reprinted
in TAX NOTES MICROFICHE DATA BASE, Doc. 84-3692 (1984); see also Tax Executives Institute
Comments on Tax Bills, 23 TAX NOTES 651, 653-54 (1984) (arguing that "subjecting accu-
mulated DISC income to taxation at this time could have a disastrous effect on the finan-
cial viability of numerous U.S. exporters."); cf. Kotran, supra note 78, at 8 (DISC
deferrals were really meant to be exemptions; exporters should not have to pay tax
"simply because the government has decided to terminate the program"); Dole, "'The
Great Tax Grab '" Sen. Dole Replies, Wash. Post, July 12, 1984, at A20, col. 4 (Chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee arguing in support of forgiveness of DISC-deferred tax
and stating that DISC legislative history makes clear that DISC deferral "could amount
to a partial tax exemption").
97 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., A Lobbying Victory Gives Exporters a Windfall, Bus. WE., Aug. 27, 1984, at
77, 78 ("[Tax forgiveness] may prove to be 'a benefit given and taken away.' ") (quoting
David L. Prewitt, tax manager, Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.).
99 See, e.g., Prospects Uncertain on Foreign Sales Corporation Provision, supra note 94, at
790-91. If Congress imposed a tax payable within a definite period on the deferred
DISC income, most accountants would require their clients to show the full amount of
the deferred tax on the balance sheet as a deferred liability. Id. at 791.
100 Id.
101 Bernick, supra note 78, at 271.
102 Europeans Announce Plans to Force GATT Review of DISC and FSC, supra note 7, at
228.
103 Metzenbaum, supra note 78.
104 Id.; see Kotran, supra note 78, at 8-9 (Europeans "are convinced that Congress'
1194 [Vol. 71:1181
REFORMULATING GATT RULES
Existing GATT rules support the EEC's position. The qualifier
condemned DISC because DISC deferred direct tax on economic
processes located inside the United States.10 5 The forgiveness pro-
vision, enacted after GATT promulgated the qualifier, perpetuates
the exemption of domestic economic processes that rendered DISC
illegal. By forgiving tax on domestic economic processes, the
United States has simply disregarded the qualifier.
In response, the United States argues that "forgiveness merely
gives effect to the indefinite nature of the deferral when it was origi-
nally granted under DISC." 106 This argument is especially weak in
light of the United States' reliance on the distinction between defer-
ral and exemption while defending DISC. 10 7 The United States ap-
parently believes that it can now argue that the DISC deferral was
actually permanent because it has learned that the legality' 08 of a
direct tax incentive program under GATT is determined by the ter-
ritoriality principle and not by the technical difference between
deferral and exemption.' 0 9
The United States has defended FSC primarily by capitalizing
on defects in the GATT" dispute resolution process rather than con-
structing substantive arguments. The United States contends that
GATT should associate the forgiveness provision with DISC rather
than FSC.110
Because the aim of the dispute settlement process in GATT is to
seek discontinuance of GATT-illegal practices and not to provide
compensation, we feel no obligation to tax the deferred earnings.
Such taxation would be tantamount to paying the community for
the past damages of the DISC, a practice totally unprecedented in
GATT.I' 1
However, GATT article XXIII(2) technically authorizes the imposi-
forgiving the $10 billion plus is simply concrete evidence that they have been correct in
calling DISC an illegal export subsidy all along.").
105 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
106 Lightizer's Statement, supra note 62, at 63.
107 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
109 The [DISC] tax benefit was designed as a deferral for as long as a DISC
remained in existence because it was considered then that deferral, rather
than complete exemption, would be more likely to be considered compat-
ible with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs [sic] (GAT-) to
which the United States is a party. We have since found that the deferral
of tax, rather than exemption, is not considered determinate under
GATT.
Dole, supra note 96.
110 Lightizer's Statement, supra note 62, at 63.
111 Id. The Reagan administration's position is inconsistent with the administra-
tion's reliance on the EEC's retaliatory threats to support its proposal to replace DISC.
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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tion of economic sanctions (although it has never been used)." 12
According to one commentator, "The drafting history of [article
XXIII(2)] ... makes clear that the purpose of the remedy is purely
compensatory."' 13
GATT dispute resolution procedures can span substantial
lengths of time."t 4 Commentators have cited the inefficiency of the
GATT process illustrated by the DISC controversy." 15 However, as
a GATT signatory and participant in litigation against other na-
tions, 116 the United States should promote efficient GATT dispute
resolution procedures. Exploiting inefficient GATT procedures en-
courages similar abuse by trading partners and does nothing to jus-
tify the FSC legislation on its merits.
Although the FSC mechanism satisfies the GATT qualifier,"17
the forgiveness provision, which exporters consider an integral part
of the FSC package," t8 is unacceptable to the EEC.119 The EEC's
well-founded objections to the FSC forgiveness provision indicate
that the FSC program does not meet its objective of thwarting EEC
retaliation. 120 As one Senator warned, including the forgiveness
112 Hudec, supra note 48, at 150. Article XXIII provides:
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting
parties concerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the
type described in paragraph I (c) of this Article, the matter may be re-
ferred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall
promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make ap-
propriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they con-
sider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate....
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or
parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties
of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they de-
termine to be appropriate in the circumstances. If the application to any
contracting party of any concession or other obligation is in fact sus-
pended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than sixty days
after such action is taken to give written notice to the Executive Secretary
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agree-
ment and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following
the day on which such notice is received by him.
3 BISD, supra note 14, at 45-46.
113 Hudec, supra note 48, at 150 n.6.
114 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
115 Discussing the controversy over the forgiveness provision, one writer noted that
"given [GATT's] glacial pace, it could be another ten years before anything happens."
Trying It Their Way, FORBES, Oct. 22, 1984, at 176, 177. This statement may prove to be
accurate, for "[m]ost delegations to GAT. .. have adopted a 'wait and see' attitude"
regarding FSC's forgiveness provision. Bernick, supra note 78, at 271.
116 Hudec, supra note 48, at 156.
117 See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. Some large exporters which have
benefited from FSC appreciate the importance of satisfying GATT, and have had "sec-
1196 [Vol. 71:1181
1986] REFORMULATING GA TT RULES 1197
provision in the FSC legislation, Congress only "[substituted] one
kind of trouble for another."' 12 1 Congress ought to avoid the EEC's
threats of retaliation by enacting a substitute for the DISC program
that complies with existing GATT rules. 122
2. The Forgiveness Provision as an Unjustifiable Loss
of Tax Revenue
Congress sought with the FSC legislation to provide a tax in-
centive for exporters that is comparable to DISC in terms of benefit
to exporters and cost to the Treasury. 123 However, the forgiveness
provision deprives the Treasury of a substantial source of potential
revenue. 124 Despite the substantial burden on United States export-
ond thoughts" about FSC. A Tax Break for Exports that Hurts "The Small Guy in Kansas,"
supra note 78, at 86-87.
121 Administration Urges Passage of Foreign Sales Corporation Proposal, 22 TAx NOTES 554,
555 (1984) (quoting Sen. John Heinz).
122 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
123 Id.
124 Outright forgiveness of the $10 billion in DISC-deferred tax drew sharp criticism
from American commentators, see, e.g., A Lobbying Victory Gives Exporters a Windfall, supra
note 98, at 77 (characterizing forgiveness provision as "fruit[] of a lobbying victory");
Rowen, The Great Tax Grab, Wash. Post,July 5, 1984, at A21, col. 5 (forgiveness provision
as "great tax grab"), who argued that the forgiveness provision is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the purpose of the DISC legislation because Congress meant to defer taxa-
tion, not to exempt exporters from tax. See Metzenbaum, supra note 78 ("Each and every
company that established a DISC since 1971 knew that the deferred taxes [under DISC]
would ultimately have to be paid."). DISC's legislative history supports the contention
that Congress designed the original DISC legislation as a tax deferral mechanism. See
The Revenue Act of 1971: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1971) (memorandum supplied by Department of the Treasury: Summary Explanation
of DISC and Foreign Country Practices) ("While deferral may be for a substantial period
of time, it cannot be permanent."); 1 Tax Proposals Contained in the President's New Economic
Policy: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1971)
(statement of John S. Nolan, chairman, Committee on Taxation, U.S. Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce) ("DISC proposal only defers taxes on the profits
of the DISC from selling products for export"); International Aspects of the President's New
Economic Policies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 115 (1971) (statement ofJohn Connally, Secretary of the
Treasury) (DISC only provides deferral).
Notwithstanding DISC's legislative history, the loss of a potential source of substan-
tial revenue also angered critics. See Bernick, supra note 78, at 271 ("[S]ome members
[of the House Ways and Means Committee] have long felt that DISC deferrals are a ripe
source of revenue."). They argued that the forgiveness provision was inappropriate in
an era of concern over a soaring budget deficit:
There are a lot of American people, the elderly and middle-class people,
who are going to pay $7 billion more one way or another in medicare and
medicaid .... It is interesting to note that with one sweep of the pen
early Saturday morning, we gave $12 billion to the major corporations in
this country tax-free, as a gift .... Twenty-eight million people in this
country are going to have $8 or $9 billion in cuts in benefits while we
gave billions away to General Electric, TRW, Allied Chemical, Exxon,
and the like.
Kotran, supra note 78, at 8 (quoting Rep. Fortney Stark).
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ers and the serious balance of payments problem that a collection of
deferred taxes would occasion, the loss of potential revenue is not
justified if FSC fails to soothe the United States' trading partners. 25
Had Congress simply left DISC in place, the United States' trading
partners would still be arguing that DISC violated GATT, but the
United States Treasury would not have lost a vast source of poten-
tial revenue.
IV
ALTERNATIVES TO FSC AND THE FORGIVENESS PROVISION
Congress hoped to counteract the discriminatory impact of the
GATT distinction between direct and indirect taxes by molding its
export tax incentive program to the existing GATT rules. Both of
Congress's attempts have failed to satisfy the current rules. DISC
violated the GATT rules because it provided long term deferral of
direct tax on income derived from economic processes located in-
side the United States.1 26 Although the FSC mechanism complies
with existing GATT rules by applying its direct tax benefits only to
income derived from foreign economic processes,127 the FSC legis-
lation's forgiveness provision violates the GATT rules because it
provides tax exemptions on the same domestic economic processes
that condemned DISC. 128
Congress could satisfy the existing rules by either enacting an
American VAT 129 or keeping the FSC mechanism but requiring pay-
ment of the DISC-deferred tax. 30 Both alternatives perpetuate
GATT's fundamentally unsound distinction between direct and in-
direct tax. Furthermore, the United States should not reformulate
basic tax policy to satisfy GATT rules that unjustifiably discriminate
against countries that rely on direct taxes. Therefore, Congress
125 This was essentially the position of the Executive Committee of the Democratic
Study Group, summarized as follows in its chairman's letter to Chairman Rostenkowski
of the House Ways and Means Committee:
[T]here are too many unanswered questions to act at this time-ques-
tions regarding FSC itself as well as whether the forgiveness provision
represents an unwarranted tax giveaway or a necessary means of prevent-
ing imposition of an unfair, retroactive tax. With respect to FSC, we be-
lieve that any decision to continue export tax incentives should be
carefully designed to assure that continued loss of tax revenues is justi-
fied by an increase in exports and is needed to offset foreign tax incen-
tives which place U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage.
Letter from Hon. Matthew F. McHugh, Chairman, Democratic Study Group to Hon.
Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (June 13, 1984) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
126 See supra notes 22 & 33 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
129 See infra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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should force other signatories to reconsider the economic theory
upon which GATT is based by demanding renegotiation of
GATT. 13 1
A. Payment of DISC-Deferred Tax
Congress could resolve the international dispute over the for-
giveness provision by repealing the provision and requiring the im-
mediate and full payment of the DISC-deferred tax. Even though
this payment would boost the United States Treasury receipts and
satisfy trading partners, Congress is not likely to impose such a fi-
nancial burden on exporters while the United States is in a weak
balance of payments position.1 32
A more practical alternative is for Congress to spread the pay-
ment of the DISC-deferred tax over time.133 Congress used this
type of payment system under DISC: if a DISC lost its DISC status,
it had to pay previous years' DISC benefits over a period equal to
two years for each year that the DISC was in existence, up to a maxi-
mum of ten years.' 34 An extended payout period substantially re-
duced the effective tax on the deferred DISC income. 35 With this
reduction in mind, American exporters might be less adverse to the
payment of DISC-deferred tax over an extended period. 3 6
Although this alternative still results in a substantial loss of revenue,
it would improve the United States' relations with its trading part-
ners. Moreover, the FSC mechanism would still provide a tax incen-
tive for American exporters.
Payment of the deferred tax leaves unchallenged GATT's dis-
tinction between direct and indirect taxes. Under the FSC mecha-
nism, American exporters only receive direct tax benefits on
transactions that "occur" outside the United States.13 7 Foreign ex-
porters in indirect tax jurisdictions gain tax benefits on income de-
rived from both foreign and domestic economic processes. 38
131 See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
132 The merchandise trade deficit was predicted to reach a record high of more than
$150 billion in 1985. Reagan Proposes Export Subsidies to Gain Markets, N.Y. Times, Sept.
24, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
133 One European official has indicated that "some sort of 'partial recovery might
solve the problem.'" Bernick, supra note 78, at 271.
134 I.R.C. § 995(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
135 Because of the time value of money, taxes due in the future are less costly than
taxes due today.
136 See supra note 120. One writer reports that United States exporters would have
accepted a settlement of about $4 billion to avoid the full deferred tax liability. Rowen,
supra note 124.
137 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the GATT rules do not require such exporters to set
up foreign sales corporations or to establish a foreign presence.
B. An American VAT
Congress could also resolve the dispute over export tax incen-
tives by replacing the current income tax with a value-added tax. 13 9
An American VAT would comply with existing GATT rules and pro-
vide a simpler tax system. However, adoption of a VAT would in-
volve a fundamental restructuring of the American tax system.
The FSC's foreign presence, management, and economic pro-
cess requirements impose substantial burdens on United States ex-
porters and may render the FSC program less cost effective than
DISC. 140 Congress could alleviate these problems if it instituted a
form of VAT as the nation's primary export tax incentive. 14 1 Under
existing GATT rules, a country may remit the VAT as a border tax
adjustment even if an exporter's economic processes occur in its
home country. 142 Thus, if the United States used VAT, the FSC's
foreign presence, management, and economic process requirements
would be unnecessary.
Proponents argue that a VAT would not only provide an export
tax incentive and permit the United States to avoid the impact of the
GATT's discriminatory distinction between direct and indirect
taxes, 143 but also it would provide a more rational basis for taxa-
tion. 144 Whereas income tax is based on potential consumption,
VAT is based on actual consumption. 145 VAT supporters argue that
"taxation should be based on the actual satisfaction derived from
goods and services, rather than the ability to purchase them, and
actual satisfaction may be more closely related to expenditures for
139 This proposition has been the subject of lively debate for 15 years. See, e.g., R.
LINDHOLM, supra note 18; Smith, supra note 18; Surrey, supra note 18.
140 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text; see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXA-
TION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPLACEMENT OF DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPO-
RATIONS (DISCS), DESCRIPTION OF S. 1804 (FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION ACT) 46 (joint
Comm. Print 1983) ("for the same revenue loss, the FSC legislation may stimulate fewer
additional exports than DISC since firms would only utilize a FSC if the tax savings
cover the transaction costs of the offshore corporation").
141 There are essentially three types of VAT: "consumption," "gross product," and
"national income." See Note, Export Incentives: United States DISC Legislation as an Invalid
Subsidy Under the GATT Provisions, 20 WASHBURN LJ. 535, 551 n.134 (1981). The con-
sumption type which the EEC uses has generally been considered appropriate for the
United States by VAT advocates. Smith, supra note 18, at 79. For a simplified example
of the consumption type VAT, see supra note 18.
142 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
143 Smith, supra note 18, at 82-83.
144 Analysis of Proposals Relating to Comprehensive Tax Reform, supra note 49, at 174-75.
145 Id.
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goods and services than to income."' 46
Congress may also favor VAT's reduced effect on business deci-
sions and limited dependency on business profitability. A VAT is im-
posed on all businesses with sales, whether or not the business
actually generates a profit.147 Under the United States' current sys-
tem, tax considerations permeate the entire corporate income state-
ment. 148 Under a VAT, however, tax factors impact only the amount
of sales a company derives, therefore "inherent advantages and rel-
ative efficiencies are allowed to operate in the market economy with
minimum tax distortions."'' 49 A VAT simplifies the complex tax
analysis that accompanies capital expenditures.
Although Treasury Secretary Regan reportedly noted that the
"international competitiveness of the U.S. was a factor in Treasury's
study of fundamental tax reform," 150 the Reagan administration
"abandoned any idea of proposing a value-added tax" in October
1984.151 Regan argued that the VAT is a regressive tax, and is
therefore inconsistent with the American tax system's traditional
progressive nature. 152 The VAT makes the consumer the final payor
of tax. Because low income consumers must spend a greater pro-
portion of their incomes than high income consumers to meet their
daily costs of living, low income consumers pay a greater percentage
of their income in VAT than high income consumers. 153 Critics of
the VAT charge that income, not consumption, is the valid measure
of ability to pay tax because those with high incomes are better able
to fund purchases of goods and services which satisfy public con-
146 Id. at 162.
147 See Smith, supra note 18, at 79 (VAT "minimizes any influence taxation might
exert on decisions regarding the productive processes in industry").
148 For instance, interest expense deductibility affects the decision to finance with
debt or equity.
149 Smith, supra note 18, at 79.
150 U.S. Competitiveness is a Factor in Treasury Tax Study, Says Regan, 25 TAx NOTES 511
(Nov. 5, 1984) (paraphrasing Regan).
151 VAT Held Unlikely by Regan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1984, at D1, col. 6.
152 Id.
153 Surrey, supra note 18, at 90. The progressive tax system can be justified in terms
of equity: If people were faced with a choice between a progressive or a regressive tax
from the point of view of the very beginning of their lives, when they did
not know their capabilities and resources and exactly where they would
end up in the income distribution, they would be willing to agree to laws
under which government would mitigate, to some extent, whatever ine-
qualities emerged from a market economy.... [L]abor and property have
value only because society establishes laws and regulations which allow
each individual to engage in economic activity with relatively little inter-
ference from others .... Thus, because society establishes the frame-
work which allows labor and property to be valuable resources, it can also
establish a progressive tax system and other mechanisms to achieve a
more equitable distribution of income.
Analysis of Proposals Relating to Comprehensive Tax Reform, supra note 49, at 162.
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
sumption needs, that is, goods and services provided by the
government. 154
C. Renegotiate GATT
Any discrepancy between the extent that exporters shift direct
and indirect tax savings forward does not justify GATT's diametri-
cally opposite treatment of direct and indirect tax incentive pro-
grams.1 55 Exporters in indirect tax jurisdictions decrease export
prices at least partly because the government, by remitting or ex-
empting indirect tax, subsidizes its exporters for the price differen-
tial between foreign and domestic markets. If GATT permitted
countries to remit to exporters, or exempt exporters from, direct
tax, exporters could reduce export price in part.
Certainly the most direct (albeit most difficult) solution to the
international controversy over export tax incentives involves rene-
gotiation of GATT. The United States is at a competitive disadvan-
tage because it relies on direct taxes to a more significant degree
than its trading partners; thus, the United States has strong grounds
to demand that GATT change the rules. 156
When Congress adopted GATT in 1948, world economic con-
ditions differed substantially from conditions today. Export subsi-
dies and the effects of different tax systems did not concern the
United States, which "had emerged from World War II as the domi-
nant economic force in the Free World and was running large trade
surpluses."' 57 One writer reports,
The record of the initial GATT deliberations ... is devoid of any
discussion of the effects of differing tax systems or differing types
of taxes upon trade. Thirty years later, this failure to deal effec-
tively with taxes as export subsidies has become a source of major
inequity and serious distortions in the world trading system.' 5 8
Beginning in the 1960's, the United States sought reformulation of
the GATT ground rules. 159 The American effort failed because the
154 See Analysis of Proposals Relating to Comprehensive Tax Reform, supra note 49, at 162.
155 See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
156 Renegotiation of GATT is not a new proposition. Senator Bennett, after listen-
ing to Secretary of the Treasury Connally's discussion of the GATT position on direct
taxes during a 1971 hearing, queried, "Don't you think, looking at the thing philosoph-
ically... we would all be better off if we renegotiated the basis of our international trade
rather than continue to patch our own tax system to match the limitations in GATT?"
Foreign Trade Hearings, supra note 31, at 45 (statement of Sen. Wallace Bennett).
157 Export Policy Hearing, supra note 26, at 224 (prepared statement of Richard
Hammer).
158 Id. at 225 (prepared statement of Richard Hammer).
15) The United States sought reformulation of GAI' art. XVI:4. see supra note 14,
under GATT art. XVI:5, which provides:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of the provisions of
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EEC and Japan "simply refused to entertain any possibility of mean-
ingful compromise or revision of the rules which so favor their ex-
porters."160 The demise of DISC and the United States' attempt to
satisfy the GATT qualifier with FSC indicate that it will be quite dif-
ficult for the United States to convince other GATT signatories to
change the ground rules.
Even though "[w]ise diplomats do not like to deal with ques-
tions that have no good answers,"161 the United States should press
the EEC and other GATT members to change GATT's position on
direct and indirect taxes. Disputes and threats of retaliation will un-
doubtedly continue until the United States and its trading partners
reconsider GATT's characterization of direct and indirect taxes, for
therein lies the fundamental inequity at the heart of the DISC and
FSC controversies.16 2
If the United States succeeds in reformulating the ground rules,
Congress could reenact a tax incentive program like DISC. 163
American exporters, like their counterparts in indirect tax jurisdic-
tions, could reduce their export prices and gain tax benefits on in-
come derived from domestic economic processes. Such a change in
this Article from time to time with a view to examining its effectiveness, in
the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of this Agree-
ment and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or in-
terest of contracting parties.
3 BISD, supra note 14, at 31. For a detailed account of the steps taken by the United
States under this GATT provision, see Export Policy Hearing, supra note 26, at 236-41
(prepared statement of Richard Hammer).
160 Export Policy Hearing, supra note 26, at 241 (prepared statement of Richard
Hammer).
161 Hudec, supra note 48, at 167.
162 One writer suggests that GATT change the rules to permit review of indirect tax
incentive schemes on a case-by-case basis. See K. DAM, supra note 19, at 216 ("[A] case-
by-case approach ... would give not only theoretically more correct results but also
results more widely accepted as just and appropriate.").
163 This Note presumes that DISC actually provided an incentive to American ex-
porters. However, American commentators and politicians have criticized DISC on the
grounds that the revenue cost to the Treasury outweighs the potential benefit of in-
creased exports. They contend that an American company's decision to export depends
on the existence of an attractive foreign market, not the availability of DISC benefits.
See, e.g., President Carter's Message to Congress: Tax Reduction and Reform, PUB. PA-
PERS (BooK 1) 158, 160 (Jan. 20, 1978) ("[T]here is no justification for the DISC export
subsidy ... to encourage our firms to do exactly what they would do anyway-export to
profitable foreign markets."); Coiporate Tax Break on Exports is Likely to be Rescinded Soon,
Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1977, at 1, col. 6 ("An airplane company doesn't sell a plane in Eu-
rope because it is getting a break from DISC. It sells the plane because it has found
someone over there who wants to buy it.") (quoting Alan Benasuli, analyst, Drexel,
Burnham & Co.). Discussion of the economic efficiency of an export tax incentive pro-
gram like DISC is beyond the scope of this Note. For a concise discussion of the case
against DISC, see Note, Export Promotion Through Tax Incentives: The Future of DISC Under
the GA'II"Subsidies Code, 20 VA.J. Ir'l. L. 171, 190-98 (1979).
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the rules would render the FSC's foreign presence, management,
and economic process requirements unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Although the FSC mechanism itself complies with the GATT
qualifier, the forgiveness provision violates GAIT rules and is vig-
orously rejected by the United States' trading partners. Because the
FSC legislation fails to achieve its acknowledged goal of placating
these trading partners, the loss of $10 billion of potential revenue
from DISC deferred taxes to the United States Treasury is
unjustified.
The United States should not appease other GATT signatories
by molding its export tax incentive program to comply with the dis-
criminatory GATT rules. Rather, the United States should demand
reformulation of GAIT's outdated economic assumptions regard-
ing direct and indirect taxes. Under reformed GATT rules American
exporters could compete effectively and fairly with their foreign
counterparts.
Ronald D. Sernau
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